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The purpose of this thesis is to define the poaching problem in sub-Saharan
Africa, to provide for the development of solutions, and to illustrate the
significance of the problem to both Africa and the United States. This objective is
achieved by illustrating the similarities between poaching and insurgency,
developing a typology for the classification of different forms of poaching, and
applying an insurgency/counterinsurgency model to these scenarios. Additionally,
by addressing the negative effects poaching has on economic, political, and social
issues we demonstrate that poaching is a problem that extends beyond the loss of
selected animal species.
Through the application of our model to actual cases of poaching, we
demonstrate the utility of drawing upon insurgency theory for providing solutions
to the poaching problem. As a result, this thesis offers an atypical approach for
systematically conceptualizing and implementing effective counterpoaching
strategies. After developing a framework for analytically thinking about the
poaching problem, we make recommendations regarding the role of specific US
forces within a comprehensive strategy of engagement. Finally, we comment on
the importance of defining strategies whose methods of implementation are
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The purpose of this thesis is to define the poaching problem in sub-Saharan
Africa and to develop possible solutions for the problem. We will argue that
governments confronted with poaching face dilemmas that are analogous to the
traditional problems of insurgency. By illustrating the similarities between
insurgencies and poaching, we will demonstrate that the solutions for combating
poaching are analogous to those for combating insurgencies. We will analyze the
varied aspects of poaching through the use of a modified insurgent/counter-
insurgent model and propose solutions to the problem. The application of this
model will demonstrate that low impact, low cost solutions may best address the
poaching problem from a number of perspectives. Additionally, we will show that
the types of options available to United States policy makers in Sub-Saharan
Africa, through the use of Special Operations Forces, may provide long term
benefits which are disproportion-ate to their cost.
B. BACKGROUND
Historically, United States (US) policy towards sub-Saharan Africa can be
termed erratic at best and incoherent at worst. During the cold war era, US policy
was aimed at simply countering any Soviet influence in the region. With the fall
of the Soviet Union, US Policy seems to be one of getting involved in African
affairs only during times of crisis: severe famine, ethnic genocide, and gross cases
of regional instability. By following a reactive policy towards Africa the US has
involved itself at the most expensive end of the spectrum of engagement, when the
prognosis for success is at its lowest point. Today, Africa presents an opportunity
for the US to become pro-active in its foreign policy and to pursue initiatives that
will benefit the countries of Africa in the present and promote stability into the
future. Today's worldwide concerns for the global environment open inroads to
the application ofUS preventive-diplomacy on the African Continent.
Environmental security is a subject that is drawing a great deal of attention
in the US and in many other countries around the world. These concerns range
from issues regarding nuclear waste disposal to oil spills and the problems of
desertification. Today, US policy-makers have come to the conclusion that
environmental issues are more closely associated with matters of economic
stability and broader notions of national security, then during any other time ofUS
foreign policy. This is evidenced by the many multilateral environmental
agreements that currently exist between the US and other nations. Environmental
issues have been incorporated into American foreign policy. Included in these
issues are the concerns for the habitat and diverse wildlife of the African continent.
'US Foreign Policy Toward Africa.
These concerns represent an opportunity for meaningful US engagement in
Africa.
The African continent, and specifically sub-Saharan Africa, is home to
many wildlife species that are indigenous to that continent alone. A large
percentage of sub-Saharan African countries rely on tourism for a significant
portion of their GNP. Countries that view the preservation of wildlife as a long
term, sustainable, and renewable resource have come to understand and appreciate
the negative effects of animal poaching. Countries that are ineffective in
combating poaching stand to suffer losses that far exceed the extinction of selected
animal resources. Poaching causes economic loss by destroying or depleting
animal resources which can represent a significant percentage of generated
income. Additionally, loss of animal diversity causes ecological problems and
contributes to the adoption of harmful long term agricultural practices.
Poaching's effects on issues of national and regional security is perhaps the most
profound. The government's inability to confront poaching casts doubt on its
ability to cope with both internal and external threats. Internally, this is reflected
in the inability to enforce specific laws within the confines of the country.
2
Baker, James former US Secretary of State, before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on
Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans. 20 June 1996.
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Dr. Brian Child, Statement By Dr. Brian Child, Submitted To The House Committee In International
Relations, Subcommittee On Africa On Economic Development Of Africa's Resources, March 17, 1997.
Externally, this reflects an inability to control border regions and to reassure the
population that the government can protect them from external threats. In
laymen's terms, poachers represent a fundamental challenge to national
sovereignty as well as a very real economic threat.
In general, but from the perspective of African governments, the poacher is
an insurgent. In particular, the poacher presents a multi-dimensional problem, in
particular, to the government. Like the insurgent, he operates where the
government is weak, and his work destroys the credibility of the established
regime. His existence questions the government's ability to uphold its laws,
protect its people, and enforce its borders. The insurgent and the poacher work to
erode the linkage between the government and the population from which they
draw support. The poacher, like the insurgent, finds himself forced to navigate
within the boundaries of the environment in which he operates. The poacher may
experience varying degrees of difficulty regarding his ability to maneuver. The
poacher may enjoy the full support of the local population, being able to call upon
them for supplies, aid, or to conceal his presence from the government. The
poacher may be a member of the local population. In this best case scenario, the
poacher has complete freedom to come and go as he pleases, enjoys complete
anonymity, and can count on the local community for support.
4
At the very least, the poacher requires that the population tolerate his
presence and not pursue hostile policy towards him. If the poacher is not a
member of the community he will be unable to hide his presence and must rely on
the community to conceal him. If the poacher finds the population opposed to his
existence, there is little he can do except to find another area in which to operate.
However, poachers, unlike insurgents, do not desire to supplant the existing
government, but rather to exploit the fissures that may exist between the host
government and the populace. In this regard, the poacher can be even more
elusive, as his goal is not to eventually confront the government, but to forever
stay hidden. The end the poacher seeks is not to displace the government, but to
take advantage of its inefficiency.
In 1991, the US dedicated fifteen million dollars of bio-diversity funding to
sub-Saharan Africa. This funding was given to more then a dozen countries with
varied results. Long term effects can still be seen in countries where this money
was utilized wisely towards an effective bio-diversity campaign, and more
specifically towards counterpoaching. Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Senegal are
examples of countries that effectively used bio-diversity funds in a manner that
promoted economic growth by protecting indigenous wildlife. Unfortunately, a
4
Leites Nathan, and Wolf Charles Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. (
RAND, February 1970).
majority of these countries mishandled this bio-diversity funding and chose to
spend it on high-tech, expensive, and ultimately disappointing programs rather
than on adopting low cost, sustainable, and ultimately more effective alternatives
that addressed the root of the poaching issue.
C. THE TYPICAL RESPONSE
Many governments in sub-Saharan Africa have fallen prey to the notion that
victory against poaching requires high levels of expenditure on highly sophisti-
cated, and technologically advanced systems. This paradigm is analogous to the
dominant counterinsurgency approach adopted by the United States in Vietnam
and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In both examples, the result was an
ineffective application of technology against an asymmetric and non-linear threat.
We argue that an approach that takes into consideration the capabilities and
limitations of each state stands a greater likelihood of success. This type of
approach seems unorthodox because it is not based on any preconceived notion of
how strategies have been derived in the past. The uniqueness of the situation in
Africa requires that non-typical strategies be developed to address the poaching
problem.
interviews conducted with Lt. Col. Gary Walker, USA (Ret.) former DAO Namibia and Botswana, and
William Ellis former SAO Senegal.
Given that poaching is a problem with linkages to sovereignty, economy,
and the population as a whole, it is an issue of concern. Due to inherent
inefficiencies and limitations of manpower, training, and budget, the majority of
police forces within sub-Saharan Africa are ill-suited to conduct counterpoaching
and border security operations. By default the burden of the counterpoaching
effort falls upon the military. Because there is little or no external military threat
to many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the military has the freedom of
maneuver to focus their energies on counterpoaching. Actively involving the
military in counter-poaching achieves two positive ends. First, it physically, as
well as perceptually, removes the military from the stereotypical role of being the
personal strong arm of the regime. Second, it involves them in pursuits that are
beneficial to the populace as a whole. A military used in a counterpoaching role is
no longer seen as a probable tool of government repression. Instead, it is seen as a
competent, professional military serving the public good.
Although the host nation military force may be the best candidate for
counterpoaching, it will often lack the skills and training necessary to counter the
grass roots threat posed by poaching. It is here that proactive US military involve-
ment can have the greatest impact. Military-to-military contact through Joint
Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) and Mobile Training Teams (MTT)
provides the best vehicle for pursuing such a policy of assistance. JCETs and
MTTs have the additional benefit of fostering the kind of civil-military
relationship that is the cornerstone ofUS philosophy of military subordination to
civilian authority.
D. SIGNIFICANCE
United States involvement in Africa has, and will, continue to increase.
USAID's projected expenditure for Africa in FY 98 exceeds one billion dollars.
This figure does not reflect any costs which may result from crisis relief or
humanitarian assistance should they become necessary. In light of the fact that the
US has chosen to become involved in places like Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and
Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), it only makes sense to find ways to engage
these countries prior to crisis. Doing so will reduce the cost in dollars and cents as
well as in lives. The added benefits of engaging African militaries now is twofold.
First, African nations actively engaged with US military training programs will be
better prepared not only for counterpoaching operations, but for participation in the
African Intervention Force Initiative. Secondly, US Special Operations Forces
benefit by gaining first hand the experience of working with host nation forces
under conditions that cannot be duplicated in training centers or simulated
exercises.
6USAID, The USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation.
E. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will use case study analysis to evaluate successful and
unsuccessful counterpoaching campaigns. The themes discussed in the
introduction provide the background for further analysis. In Chapter II, we will
define and describe the poacher/counterpoaching model as it applies to internally
and externally sponsored poaching. We will then present ideal strategies for
generic internal and external poaching scenarios prior to applying the model to
actual cases in Africa.
Chapter III employs case study methodology to evaluate four case studies in
sub-Saharan Africa. These cases (Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and The Central
African Republic), provide a representative group of poaching scenarios which we
both successful and unsuccessful in their outcome. Having identified key elements
of successful and unsuccessful counterpoaching campaigns, in Chapter IV we will
recommend possible US courses of action as a participant in counterpoaching in
Africa. Furthermore, we will highlight the benefits associated with the use ofUS
Special Operations Forces in assisting host nations in their efforts to combat
poaching and will comment on the typical pitfalls experienced by program
sponsors who are unwilling to develop strategies that are compatible with host
nation capabilities. Finally, we provide a word of caution regarding the ultimate
ownership of developmental programs.
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II. ADAPTING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL
TO COUNTERPOACHING
A. MODEL SELECTION
To analyze and understand more clearly the poaching/counterpoaching
problem in sub-Saharan Africa, we have chosen to use an insurgency/counter-
insurgency model. The similarities that exist between the poacher and the
insurgent, and thus the measures required to successfully counter each of these
problems, are extremely close. That these two "problems" are similar in nature, is
not just our hypothesis, but one that is accepted by some in Southern Africa.
General L.M. Fisher, the senior military officer of the Botswanan Defense Forces
included both insurgency and poaching in the same threat category as he detailed
the current and future threats to the entire Southern African Region. Fortunately,
it is exactly these similarities that allow the ease of adaptation from a comprehen-
sive counterinsurgent plan to one of counterpoaching.
B. INSURGENT/COUNTERINSURGENT MODEL
Probably the single most useful tool in understanding the problems of an
insurgency is the basic model introduced to us by Dr. Gordon McCormick, as part
of his seminar on guerrilla warfare taught at the Naval Postgraduate School. This
7
Fisher, L.M. (Major General, Botswana) "New Threats and New Roles For the Military" Seminar: Role
of the Military in Democratization: A Southern African Perspective. 18 June 1996.
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operate if it is to be successful in its efforts to defeat an insurgency. This model
also illustrates the paths that the insurgent or guerrilla follows to separate the
population from the government as well as its possible connection to an external
support mechanism. The model is useful in analyzing and explaining the shortfalls
of historical counterinsurgency efforts, such as our own flawed and failed efforts
in Vietnam and the Soviet Union efforts in Afghanistan.
The model we have chosen is built around the interactions of four sets of
actors. The actors are comprised of the Government, the Guerrilla, the Popula-
tion and the Partisan or External Support Mechanism.
C. POACHING DEFINED
Before we can modify and apply the insurgent/counterinsurgent model to
poaching we must first describe and define poaching and the varied types of
poaching problems. For the purpose of this thesis, poaching is defined as the
organized, illegal killing of wild species of game animals for commercial
purposes.
Sub-Saharan African countries, in truth, face two primary types of
poaching. These primary types are classified as Internal and External poaching.
Internal poaching consists of the organized efforts of groups or individuals, within








Figure 1. Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Model
poaching consists of the organized efforts of groups or individuals who cross
borders to illegally harvest game and then remove the animal remains to be sold
elsewhere. In the both internal and external poaching, the end result may be the
sale of the animal remains outside the country of its origin. The true distinction
between the two is that internal poaching deals with a country's own citizens
13
poaching game within its borders while external poaching deals with foreigners
violating a border to illegally harvest the game of another country.
Just as there are two primary types of poachers, that is to say, internal and
external, there are also two primary reasons why poachers conduct these activities.
The two primary rationales for poaching are Commercial and Subsistence.
Commercial poaching, as described previously, is the illegal harvest of wild
species for future commercial profit. Subsistence poaching is the small scale,
unauthorized harvest of animals, for the sole purpose of consumption. This is
typically done in rural areas by the extremely poor and by those who still practice
the traditions of ancient cultures. Subsistence poaching, although technically
illegal, is not considered to be a serious problem by most African nations. For this
reason, we will focus our analysis on the more destructive internal and external
commercial poaching problems, with one exception. We will cover one unique
case of a hybrid of external/subsistence poaching due to its large scale and its
destructive potential. This hybrid form of external/subsistence poaching is the
unique case of large scale organized subsistence poaching that is currently taking
place on the Central African Republic's border where Sudanese rebels have
resorted to poaching in order to supply meat to their forces resisting the govern-
ment in Khartoum.
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The cases we will analyze are depicted in the following matrix (Table 1),
showing countries affected by types of poaching, (Internal or External), and
rationales, (Commercial or Subsistence).









Zimbabwe Central African Republic
* Internal/Subsistence poaching not considered a great threat
Table 1. Countries Facing Poaching Problems by Type & Rationale
D. THE DYNAMICS OF THE POACHING PROBLEM
Poachers, both internal and external, create the same dilemma for the
government that is created by the insurgent. For this reason it is understandable
that the initial reaction of the government would be to attempt to catch the poacher
in the act and then either arrest or otherwise neutralize him. Certainly this needs to
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be done. However, it is difficult to accomplish because initiative, as well as other
advantages, lie with the poacher. The poacher as an internal problem is typically
a sub-set of the local population. As a member of the local community he is
inextricably linked to that community, where the government, or its representa-
tives, are viewed as outsiders.
As an external problem, the poacher may employ or rely on locals to assist
him in his activity. In many cases, individuals residing on the border of a country
may have more in common with the external poacher racially, ethnically or
religiously, then they do with their own government. This phenomena is common
throughout Africa, where national boundaries were drawn according to convenient
geographical land marks, rather than on any ethnic, tribal or racial basis.
Whether internal or external, the poacher retains the initiative and chooses
the time and place of his activity. Typically the government becomes aware of his
actions only after the carcasses of the animals are found. Even if the government
is capable or fortunate enough to catch or kill a few poachers there will always be
others to take their place because the lure of money is greater than the risk of being
caught. Until the risk of capture exceeds the expected payoff of successful
poaching there is no incentive for poachers to stop their activities. Only when a
government has increased the likelihood of being caught, to a level that outweighs
the rewards for poaching, will poachers choose to cease their operations.
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Due to the high payoff and low risk, the one dimensional strategy of killing
or capturing poachers is of only limited value because the poacher is a manifesta-
tion of a much larger problem. Before a government can formulate an effective
strategy that will deter poaching it must first understand the root causes of
poaching.
E. THE ROOT OF THE POACHING PROBLEM
If a government's counter poaching strategy is to be successful, it must look
past the temptation of focusing all its efforts on the destruction of the individual
poacher. The government must address the questions ofwhy poachers exist, as
well as who they are. Poaching is the product of economics, greed, and
ignorance on several levels. In the simplest economic sense, poaching exists
because markets exist. Whether the products are sold for ornamental or medicinal
purposes, as in the case of elephant tusks and rhino horns, or for consumption, as
in the case of bush-meat, an established market desires these goods. It is this
demand, combined with poverty and a failure to see the true value of the animals,
that persuades the internal and the external poacher to risk his life in the role of the
supplier. It is understandable that an individual, whose annual gross income may
be less than $100 US, would risk his life for one nights work and the chance to
earn $200 US for a rhino horn. In reality his benefit may be greater than money
alone, because in many cases the poacher and the animal are in direct competition
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for grazing or farm land. So too, it is understandable that the middle-man, the who
sent the poacher on the "mission," would accept these risks because that same
rhino horn will sell for thousands of dollars on the outside market.
For both the poacher and the middle-man, the game animal is seen to be of
no value in its live state. The combination of poverty, greed, and ignorance
manifests itself as poaching. For this reason, a government that fights only the
manifestation, that is to say the poacher, is doomed to fail because it has failed to
address the poverty, greed, and ignorance that has given birth to the poacher.
F. THE GOVERNMENTS ROLE
The first challenge to the government is one of recognition. The
government must recognize that the poaching problem poses two distinct
challenges that correspondingly, have two distinct solution sets. First, is the
immediate or short cycle challenge of halting the poacher and preserving the
threatened animal species. Second, is the future or long cycle challenge that must
look beyond the manifestation of the poaching problem and address its root causes.
The long cycle challenge focuses on building a national infrastructure and
economy, to produce the type of prosperity that results in a government being
capable of addressing the roots of discontent that give birth to poachers and other
illegal activity. The ability of a state to address the long cycle challenges is a
18
direct reflection of its "strength." Although short and long cycle challenges have
different solutions they are in fact linked. The focus of this thesis is on the short
cycle challenge because it is the first step in addressing the greater concerns of the
long cycle challenge.
A government that recognizes its animal population as a renewable resource
must develop a sensible program to stop the poacher's operations. To design this
program a thorough understanding of the nature of the problem must be married to
the resources available to counter the problem. This program must be comprehen-
sive and avoid the temptation of focusing solely on the manifestation of the
problem, the poacher. It is only through a comprehensive approach that a
government can achieve success.
To accomplish this task, in an internal problem, the government must
break through the poacher's veil of anonymity by strengthening its own bond with
the population. Unlike the poacher who is an accepted community member, the
government must gain acceptance through its actions. This is extremely difficult
in rural areas where a majority of poaching takes place and where government
control and influence are inherently weak. Poachers take advantage of this
imbalance by sharing their profits with the community, thus strengthening their
For a complete discussion of a state's relative strength in relation to internal societies see, Migdal, Joel
Strong Societies and Weak States. (Princeton University Press).
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own position and further destroying any linkage between that population and the
government. For the poacher, this link is the most crucial aspect of his operation.
9
It provides a support base from which to operate, and provides a certain level of
concealment and protection from governmental action. This link provides
everything the poacher needs to carry out and sustain his operations. The
concealment provided by the population essentially blinds the government to the
poachers activity. Unable to see, the government is rendered impotent in its efforts
to confront and combat the poacher. For this reason, the link the government
establishes with the population becomes the pivotal point in its attempts to counter
the poacher. The stronger this relationship, the easier it will be for the government
to sever the tie between poacher and population. Strengthening this connection
directly and proportionally weakens the bond that exists between the poacher and
the population. If a government can successfully co-opt the population, and if that
population freely gives information on the activities or identities of the poachers,
his veil of anonymity begins to unravel. Employing a three pronged strategy of
strengthening the bond with the population, severing the ties between the poacher
and the population, and pursuing the poacher directly, will result in the greatest
likelihood for eventual success.
9
Leites Nathan, and Wolf Charles Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts.
(RAND, February 1970).
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The government can do this in several ways. One way is to emplace
government representatives in the outlying communities to be responsive to the
community's needs. In the case of communities that live in the immediate vicinity
of the animals, the government must educate the populace on the value of the
animals to that specific community, not just the state. This is typically done by a
government directly reinvesting money gained from animal based tourism in these
communities and by employing individuals from these communities as game
wardens. Once the community becomes a stakeholder in the protection of the
animal, and realizes the monetary benefit of doing so, they are more likely to be
intolerant of the poacher. The animal that once represented an immediate, but one-
time, profit, now represents a livelihood that can support entire communities.
Once the bond between the poacher and the populace is broken, the poacher
becomes visible to the government and he can be arrested or otherwise neutralized.
This indirect approach works in both cases of internal and external poaching.
However, in the case of external poaching the government has another link that
must be disrupted in order to be successful. This is the link that exists between the
external poacher and his support structure or those within the country who may
feel kinship with the poacher on an ethnic basis. Because these ethnic bonds may
transcend borders, the government must use the same approach of strengthening
its tie with its own population, while simultaneously interdicting the poacher and
21
applying pressure on his government. Disruption methods may include diplomatic
efforts between the heads of state in the bordering nations as well as more active
measures such as cross border operations to interdict the external poacher as he
attempts to carry out his crime in the host nation.
Poaching, both internal and external, must be addressed in these more
indirect and comprehensive ways if the government is to have any hope in saving
its animal resources. It should also be stated that there is an international
dimension in all cases ofpoaching. In both cases, the government that is facing
the problem must not forget the international community. After all, the outside
community is the financial supporter, through tourist dollars, and can be of great
assistance in applying diplomatic pressure on governments that benefit from the
export of these illegal goods, or turn a blind eye on their citizens who are the
external poacher. Outside sources have also supported governments facing
poaching problems with financial support and military training and assistance.
G. APPLYING THE COUNTERPOACHING MODEL
In order to make McCormick's insurgent model applicable to poaching and
counterpoaching, minor modifications must be made. These modifications include
changing the Guerrilla apex to read Poacher and in removing the path of attack
from the poacher to the government. Unlike the insurgent, the poacher has no
22
desire to directly challenge the government. Rather, he is satisfied to conduct his
operations in a way that exploits the government's inefficiencies.
H. COUNTERPOACHING STRATEGIES
Having identified the primary types of poaching, the commercial or
subsistence rationales, and modified the counterinsurgency model we will describe
the ideal strategies for each type of poaching problem. They do not, at this stage,
take into account all possible mixed strategies which are defined by each states
unique set of capabilities and limitations. Variables which effect a country's
ability to implement a given strategy will include social, political, economic, or
military capabilities and limitations. The degree to which these capabilities and
limitations play upon a country's counterpoaching strategy will be addressed in
our conclusions and recommendations. Figure 2 shows the appropriate strategies
for addressing the poaching problem.
1. Internal/Commercial Poaching
Faced with this type of problem the government must pursue a strategy
which places emphasis on strengthening its relationship with the population in
which the poacher resides (Axis A). By strengthening the bond with the local
population the government must convince them that it is in their best interest to










Figure 2. Counterpoaching Model
exists between the poacher and the population (Axis B). Now exposed, the
government can effectively operate against the poacher (Axis C). The govern-
ment's ability to operate along axis C is directly related to its success in effectively
operating along axis A and B.
2. Internal/Subsistence Poaching
The governments strategy for this type ofproblem is identical to the
strategy for combating internal/commercial poaching. The government must be
able to operate effectively along all three axis, A, B, and C. Additionally, in an
internal/ subsistence problem the government has the option to provide alternative
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food and material substitutes which will eliminate the population's need to kill
wildlife.
3. External/Commercial Poaching
When faced with an external/commercial problem the government's
strategy must be twofold. First, it must operate along axis A, B, and C, as in the
case of an internal/commercial problem. However, operating along axis A, B, and
C only, is insufficient because it fails to address the external factors bearing on the
case. Secondly, the government must operate externally. External factors can
only be addressed by operating along axis E, and D. Operating along axis E
entails diplomatic measures to illicit counterpoaching support from the govern-
ment of the poacher, and efforts to bring to bear the attention and resources of the
international community. Operating along axis D may be done with or without the
consent of the poacher's host nation. Actions along this axis include cross-border
operations to interdict poachers and their logistics support, or combined opera-
tions. Combined operations depend upon diplomatic successes along axis E that
result in the poacher's government taking steps to neutralize him before he crosses
the border or after his return.
4. External/Subsistence Poaching
When faced with this fourth type of problem the ideal strategy is identical
to the one taken in external/commercial poaching. The destructive power in
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external/subsistence poaching is, in most cases, no greater than that of an internal/
subsistence problem. However, a distinction must be made when the scale of
destruction or loss is of a magnitude that rivals a commercial poaching problem.
This elevated level of destruction is exactly the situation that we will explore in
our hybrid case study of the Central African Republic.
In the following chapter we will present the case studies of Kenya, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic. Each case study is divided into three
sections; Background, Country Approach, and Analysis. Background, will set the
stage with a brief description of the poaching problem in the country. Country
Approach, illustrates the course of action each country chose to combat the
poaching problem. Finally, in the Analysis section, we will apply the counter-




This chapter will illustrate the different approaches of four states attempting
to ensure the survival of their animal resources and subsequent economic benefits
associated with that survival. These examples highlight the importance of
addressing the poaching problem in the same light as a guerrilla movement or
insurgency and stresses the importance of cultivating solutions that emerge from a
grass roots level. The focus of a grass roots strategy is on establishing, or
strengthening the government's relationship with a specific population, village, or
tribe. The examples provided demonstrate how the governments of Kenya,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Central African Republic have handled or currently
handle the poaching problem within their borders. These countries illustrate the
full spectrum of approaches that have been used against poaching. As described in
the previous chapter, there are variety of options available to governments trying
to cope with poaching. However, before the application of any specific course of
action can begin, the government must appreciate the problem in its entirety.
Governments that can objectively examine the problem and develop campaign
strategies, that address the problem as a phenomenon composed of differing
variables, stand a greater chance of defeating the problem. Conversely,
governments which fail to recognize the full dimensions of the problem are
destined to approach the problem piece-meal and find themselves treating the
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symptoms instead of the root cause. This is important to bear in mind when
examining the various ways in which these governments have attempted to
confront the problem. The results of these policies clearly demonstrate that
approaching the poaching problem in an integrated and comprehensive manner can
mean the difference between effectively combating the problem, or falling prey to
a one size fits all approach that will be destined to fail.
A. KENYA (INTERNAL /COMMERCIAL)
Kenya is an example of a country that had the capability to implement
virtually any counterpoaching strategy. What is significant about Kenya's
approach is that it solely focused on protecting the animals by eliminating the
manifestation of the problem, that is to say, the poacher. This strategy alienated
local populations and exacerbated tension between those populations and the
animals. By applying our counterpoaching model to an internal/commercial
poaching problem, the strategies derived focus on strengthening the bond between
the government and local populations. This creates an environment that is hostile
to the poacher and eventually precludes his presence as he is supplanted by the
stakeholder. This case study will illustrate, that the measures Kenya implemented
achieved the exact opposite effect. Consistent with the application of our model,
this contradictory approach could only result in failure.
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1. Background
The first attempts at managing wildlife in Kenya came with colonization.
Once British authority had been established, all wildlife became the property of the
Queen. The British eventually established game preserves which became Kenya's
national parks. Nairobi National Park, Kenya's first, was established in 1946.
The establishment of national parks meant that the indigenous peoples who had
always made use of the natural resources within these parks, both animal and
otherwise, were denied their use. This first step, even if it was an honest attempt
to preserve wildlife, caused the first emergence of tension between the indigenous
people and established authority regarding the country's wildlife resources. After
independence came to Kenya in 1963, the new government maintained control of
the national parks through the establishment of the National Park System. Profits
from the national parks were supposed to directly fund the newly independent
country's economic development. The reality, however, was that government
control of the preserves continued to prevent local populations from using the
country's natural resources and the vast majority of revenue generated from
tourism never made it to the local population. Unable to use any of the land in
which the animals lived, and unable to reap any of the benefits the animals
generated in the form of tourist dollars the average Kenyan came into direct
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Lusigi, W.J., "New Approaches to Wildlife Conservation in Kenya," Ambio Vol. 10 , No. 2-3, 1981
.
29
competition with the animal population for survival. At this point the existence of
wildlife served only as a hindrance to the average Kenyan. The result was the
emergence of an internal/commercial poaching problem. With ivory worth
$100.00 a pound and rhino horns bringing as much as $50,000.00 a piece, it is no
wonder that these animals were poached and that the elephant population dropped
from 1.3 million to around 600,000 in less then a decade. In 1989, poaching
became so extensive that the responsibility for wildlife management was given to a
new organization called the KWS (Kenya Wildlife Service), headed by Richard
Leakey. It was through Richard Leakey that Kenya's plan for combating poaching
was developed.
2. Kenya's Approach
Having realized the importance of protecting its animal resources, the
Kenyan government, and KWS in particular, had to decide upon a course of action.
The two major approaches available to wildlife management programs are
conservation through protection, and conservation through utilization. Kenya
chose to adopt the conservation through protection approach. What this meant to
Kenyans was that under no circumstances would it be acceptable to kill any of the
country's wildlife, and that the government would exercise complete control over
the animals and the human populations around animal parks and preserves.
"Cater, Nick, "Preserving the Pachyderm," Africa Report . November - December 1989.
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Countries like Tanzania and Zambia who suffered similar levels of loss regarding
elephant populations sided with Leakey, who successfully lobbied for and
obtained a ban on ivory through close coordination with CITES (Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species). In October 1989 the international
community banned all sales of ivory.
The philosophy behind the ban was simple and straight forward. By
eliminating or significantly reducing the demand for ivory, it would naturally
follow that elephant populations would rebound. The ivory ban, however, led to a
standoff between the national government, charged with enforcing the ban, and the
local population who drew no benefit from the animals. Because of the black
market demand that existed for ivory and other animal products the Kenyan
government felt that the only way to fully protect animal populations was to make
the ban permanent. Lifting it would only harm existing animal populations and
would allow the black market to continue. Strict governmental control over the
animals and the creation of protected environments further alienated the population
and put them in direct competition with the animals for living and agricultural
space. As this level of competition and animosity rose, it is not surprising that the
average Kenyan citizen, who gained no benefit from the animals, could see no
value in the animals except for the quick money to be made by killing them and
selling their body parts.
31
Although tourism generated the greatest revenue of any industry in Kenya,
the majority of this revenue never made it to the local villager, the one who stood
the most to lose from an unchecked animal population. Add to this the fact that
elephants routinely destroy crops, damage property, and harm or kill locals, and it
should come as no great surprise that there was little incentive for locals to
willingly uphold the written law. Combined with heightened levels of demand and
subsequently higher prices paid for ivory, the ban soon achieved the reverse of its
desired effect. Kenya, however, was unique in having an ally in Richard Leakey.
Leakey was an extremely charismatic and popular world figure who through
donations was able to virtually single-handedly bankroll the Kenyan effort.
At the top of his list was the development and training of a Kenyan ranger
force who could enforce the ivory ban by pursuing the poachers directly. Kenya
also started a program of fencing off animal preserves within the country, denying
access to all but a few highly influential groups or individuals. Given the National
Geographic representation of the animal's plight, it was unthinkable to actively
manage, through either hunting or culling, the increasing size of the animal
population. Kenya's hands off approach initially showed signs of success as herd
sizes grew. However, as unchecked animal populations exhausted the resources
within the preserves, populations fell as the habitat could no longer support them.
Part of the irony of Kenya's strategy of protection was that protection did little to
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ensure the long term survival of wildlife. While big game hunting was still legal,
those who made their living in the industry had a vested interest in securing stable
wildlife populations. More then a decade before the ivory ban was put into effect
hunting was banned in Kenya. After hunting was banned in 1976, the population
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of wildlife in Kenya fell between forty and sixty percent. Kenya learned nothing
from this first failed effort to protect it's wildlife. The more drastic measures
taken in conjunction with the ivory ban only made things worse.
Despite virtually unlimited resources, Kenya failed to confront the
dilemma of how to grapple with the variables that led to the animal population's
decline, while at the same time maximizing the value added to the economy by the
animal population's presence. By fully understanding and approaching the
poaching problem initially, a great deal of time, money, and animal resources
could have been saved. At the same time, the country could have benefited almost
immediately from the revenues generated by a healthy, sustainable, and renewable
natural resource.
3. Analysis
Kenya exemplifies the internal/commercial poaching problem. The
solution to this problem, as prescribed by our model, is one that emphasizes
I2
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strengthening the relationship between the community or village in which the
poaching problem exists and the government. The approach Kenya took, by
contrast, was one that only further alienated local populations. Because the
Kenyan government failed to fully understand the poaching issue, they focused
their efforts on the most recognizable manifestation of the problem. The result
was a highly competent ranger force that had initial success in neutralizing
individual poachers, but in reality failed to address the root of the poaching
problem. Kenya provides a classic example ofhow forcing a strategy from the top
down instead of empowering populations at a grass roots level can achieve the
reverse of the desired effect. In many ways Kenya is the most tragic example of a
misguided strategy. Kenya possessed almost limitless resources, international
support, and a more diverse economy that was not solely dependent on the
country's animal resources. Yet, for all their advantages the selection of an
inappropriate strategy led to an unnecessary loss of wildlife resources and an
ultimately flawed counterpoaching strategy.
B. ZAMBIA (INTERNAL/COMMERCIAL)
The case of Zambia is significant in that it illustrates how a country lacking
in resources and without external support came to adopt and implement an
effective strategy. Again, when faced with an internal/commercial poaching
problem our model predicts that an effective strategy will be one that, first and
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foremost, addresses the strengthening of the bond between the government and the
local population. This is in fact what took place in Zambia through a grass roots
based program. This grass roots program resulted in the transition of communities
that allowed poaching to take place to ones that actively protected the wildlife
resources within them.
1. Background
Zambian attitudes towards its animal resources, not unlike Kenya's,
suffered from the colonial legacy of British rule. The restrictive wildlife policies
of the colonial powers in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) almost immediately put the
local rural population in a position of competition and animosity with the animals.
"Many activities of the British colonial government in Northern Rhodesia, such as
implementing hunting quotas and license fees, restricting access to guns and
ammunition, and establishing protected areas, effectively excluded Africans from
most legal uses of and control over wildlife. In many ways the emergence of
wildlife policy in colonial Zambia excluded the local residents from participating
in the wildlife economy, thereby encouraging the establishment of illegal
activities."
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In Zambia, the policies and attitudes towards wildlife management,
saw little change after independence. By the mid 1990's the Zambian government
began its first true efforts to halt poaching within its borders.
l3
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In 1992, Zambian government raids on its internal/commercial poachers
netted over a thousand guns and resulted in the arrest of almost 2000 individual
poachers. As the Zambian government aimed their focus on the individual
poacher they also attempted to devalue the animals and make them less attractive
to the poachers. One way they attempted to curb poaching was to remove the
rhino's horns and the elephant's tusks. This expensive and time consuming task
proved to be a complete failure, as poachers killed the hornless and tuskless
animals out of spite or anger anyway. Two other reasons why a poacher would kill
de-horned animals gives good insight into the mind of the poacher. One explana-
tion is that by killing de-horned or de-tusked animals the poacher has increased the
value of any "stock" of animal parts he has or will obtain in the future because
they have been made more scarce. The other reason is that the poacher often sees
himself as a hunter who has a reputation to uphold. If he were to return with no
proof of his hunting skill he would shame himself and his family. As a result,
poachers often kill de-horned animals and cut off their ears or other body parts as
proof that they were at least successful in their craft.
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Although the rise arrests
and weapons confiscation was initially successful in curbing poaching, by early
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To combat these losses Zambia focused its efforts not on more arrests and
confiscation but rather on another natural resource, its rural population. This turn
towards the population was not a new idea in Zambia, but the realization of the
merits of grass-roots initiatives in selected parts of the country.
2. Zambia's Approach
In 1988 the government had sponsored a program called the Administrative
Management Design (ADMADE) in limited areas throughout Zambia. Unlike the
high profile efforts of worldwide conservation organizations in other countries,
this program was spawned by and implemented by the Zambians themselves,
without the prodding or assistance of outsiders. The ADMADE program was
unique in its approach towards wildlife. Under this program local residents would
receive benefits directly from wildlife-based tourism which, in Zambia, equated to
hunting. Under the ADMADE program "revenues from Zambia's lucrative,
legally sanctioned safari hunting are returned to local communities, which then
make their own decisions on allocating the money." Under this program
Zambians that had been at odds with animals were put in a position of protecting
the animals in order to preserve their own economic well-being and better their lot
in life. The success of the ADMADE program in the Luangwa River valley region
led to the adoption of similar sustainable development programs throughout the
I6
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country in the mid 1990's. The shift from protective conservation to a grass roots
program of utilization under the stewardship of local citizens began to show
results, as animal populations grew and poaching declined. In some cases the
current park rangers were converted poachers who now saw the sustainable and
renewable value the animals possessed as opposed to one time quick money
brought by poaching. Zambian officials now indicate that poaching has been
reduced by as much as 90 percent in some places, and wildlife-generated revenue
reportedly has totaled as much as $600,000 a year, 35 percent of which is returned
directly to local communities.
The successes of the ADMADE program stresses the paramount importance
of implementing counterpoaching efforts at the grass-roots level. Today, in their
eyes, Zambia's primary conservation problems stem not from poaching but from
the world community. With millions of dollars in confiscated and surplus ivory
locked up in warehouses, Zambia, along with several other nations claim that they
should be allowed to dictate their own futures by selling ivory, which would allow
them to support their counterpoaching, conservation and other developmental
efforts. The restrictions of outside conservation organizations who condemn




sales is seen by Zambians as interfering with their ability to determine their own
1 o
conservation policies and their economic future.
3. Analysis
Zambia has been quite successful in combating its internal/commercial
problem. This is the result of a variety of factors. As our model indicates, the best
strategy for solving an internal/commercial poaching problem is to strengthen the
relationship between the government and local populations. By doing so the
poacher can be smoked out or otherwise rendered incapable of carrying out his
operations. By making local populations the beneficiaries of any revenues
generated by the existence of wildlife assets, the Zambian government made local
populations stakeholders in the wildlife economy. In turn, they became proactive
in preserving that economy and ensuring that it would last. This may not have
been the rational used by the Zambian government when first considering how best
to combat poaching, but luckily for Zambia it has proven effective. Zambia,
unlike Kenya, did not have an inexhaustible supply of external support from which
to fund its efforts. Zambia lacked much of the infrastructure that would be
necessary to develop and sustain the kind of professional counterpoaching force
that Kenya developed. Zambia suffered then, as it does today, from a corrupt
18
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central government that is willing to turn a blind eye towards some poaching
activity.
Zambia's decision to implement ADMADE throughout the countryside
came almost as a fluke, rather than the result of a well thought out plan based on
the capabilities and limitations of the country. In some ways ADMADE won by
default, as the majority of expensive and ultimately flawed approaches Zambia
tried were unsuccessful.
It would be unfair to say that Zambia accidentally settled on ADMADE, in
truth they returned to a plan that was successful and coincidentally matched their
limitations and capabilities.
C. ZIMBABWE (EXTERNAL/COMMERCIAL)
The significance of Zimbabwe's counterpoaching strategy is that they have
come the closest to fully understanding the complexities of the poaching problem
and have implemented a comprehensive and balanced counterpoaching program.
Consistent with the predictions of our model, Zimbabwe's mixed strategy of
pursuing both long and short cycle aspects in parallel has yielded immediate and
quantifiable results.
1. Background
By the late 1970's and early 1980's Zimbabwe found itself in the same
quandary as other sub-Saharan Africa countries regarding its wildlife resources.
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Attitudes regarding wildlife in Zimbabwe were shaped, as in the two previous
case studies, by the colonial era. Policies adopted during the colonial era resulted
in the alienation of local populations who soon saw themselves in direct competi-
tion with protected wildlife. Local people suffered the consequences of being
forced to live with the wildlife, but were unable to reap any benefit from their
existence. The result was a feeling that it was simply better to rid the environment
of the wildlife all-together. Poaching increased dramatically as did the mere
killing of wildlife simply to eliminate it on the grounds that it constituted a threat
to local villages. So strong was the resistance to wildlife management that it
served as a rallying cry during Zimbabwe's anti-colonial movement which ended
when the country gained independence in 1980. If this were not bad enough the
poaching problem in Zimbabwe was exacerbated by the external/commercial
poachers from Zambia who, feeling the pressure at home, began to look elsewhere
to harvest animals for profit.
2. Zimbabwe's Approach
Zimbabwe's government faced significant challenges regarding its wildlife
policies. Recognizing that the country's wildlife represented a renewable, sustain-
able, and lucrative asset, the government needed to find a way to convince people
19
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of the animals potential worth and to somehow change their attitude regarding
conservation initiatives. Only by transferring some of the positive attributes of the
wild-life's existence to local communities could the government hope to convince
the people of the animals ultimate worth and to eventually check the extensive
poaching which threatened the animal population. Two programs were initiated in
the early 1980's that did just this, OPERATION WINDFALL, and the
CAMPFIRE program. (Communal Areas Management Programme For
Indigenous Resources). OPERATION WINDFALL specifically addressed the
issue of hunting and utilization of elephants. It required that revenues derived
from the utilization of elephant resources on communal land be invested in
development projects that would benefit that particular area. In its first year,
OPERATION WINDFALL generated $96,000.00, which were used to build
schools, clinics, and local infrastructure.
CAMPFIRE is a broader program than Windfall. Its goal is not just to
protect selected species, but to protect a greater ecological system which will
benefit all species and the habitat that sustains them. At the root ofCAMPFIRE is
the belief that, as natural resources become scarce, communities will gravitate
towards a rational system of resource allocation that will best serve the
20




community. Getting local villages to realize that the best allocation of resources
lies in sustainable management and utilization vice capitalizing on a one time use
is what ultimately allowed CAMPFIRE to be successful.
In order for local communities to feel as if they stand to gain from the
animal's existence the system of land ownership and benefits derived from that
ownership had to be addressed. What CAMPFIRE did in essence was to privatize
Zimbabwe's natural resources and to transfer benefits derived from wildlife
directly to the land owner, now the people who coexisted with the animals. By
empowering the population at the grassroots level with the responsibility of
managing natural resources, and by demonstrating wildlife's comparative
economic advantage over other agricultural mediums for generating revenue,
Zimbabwe was able to let the free market determine the fate of its natural, and
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more specifically, its animal resources. What evolved was a community-based
natural resource management system in which producer communities were soon
able to capitalize on the revenues generated by big game hunting, eco-tourism, and
to a lesser extent by the products derived from controlled animal harvesting.
Realizing that they stood to gain more by actively managing natural resources then
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in simply eliminating them, local populations, as stakeholders in the system took
steps to safeguard the wildlife's existence. Poaching all but died out and animal
populations soared.
By the early 1990's, the revenues generated by CAMPFIRE had exceeded
any forecasted expectation. In 1990 CAMPFIRE yielded just under Z$ 1.1
million dollars of revenue, by 1993 it had yielded just under Z$ 6.6 million dollars.
More then 74% of the revenue generated went directly to the producer commun-
ities. Today Zimbabwe faces other challenges regarding its animal resources.
Ironically, Zimbabwe is having a difficult time deciding what to do with the
surplus of wildlife it now possesses. Now that the country possesses a stable,
robust, and sustainable wildlife population, Zimbabwe, along with other sub-
Saharan African countries that have been successful in managing wildlife, has
lobbied for a lift on the ivory ban. Increasing the quotas for big game hunting has
not been successful in adequately maintaining ideal animal populations especially
among species like the elephant that cause substantial damage to habitat and
personal property if left unchecked. Staunch western animal rights groups have
been successful in maintaining inter-national support for the ban and as a result the
ban has remained in effect. Zimbabwe once again finds itself the owner of a





Zimbabwe has perhaps come the closest to understanding the full dimension
of the poaching problem and has systematically applied a strategy that takes into
account its level of available resources for combating the poaching problem and
matched them against the problem in a way that optimizes their chances for
success. Faced with a severe external/commercial poaching problem, Zimbabwe
realized it lacked the resources and diplomatic horsepower to confront the problem
directly. Zimbabwe also realized the importance of recapturing and maintaining
control over an industry that had made up as much as one third of its generated
revenue.
Once again, as the model suggests, the most important aspect of a
successful strategy is to develop and maintain a positive relationship between the
government and what under the CAMPFIRE program became referred to as the
producer communities. By establishing this bond, Zimbabwe's government knew
it would be possible to combat both external and internal poaching problems
simultaneously. By privatizing the country's wildlife resources Zimbabwe, like
Zambia, made local populations the beneficiaries of revenue generated by wildlife
assets. Zimbabwe, however, pursued its strategy not by accident, but by design.
Realizing that the vast majority of the poaching problem was external in nature,
and that they lacked the diplomatic and military muscle to address bordering
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countries directly, Zimbabwe realized that the only way for them to effectively
counter this external threat was to somehow involve their own citizens in the
campaign.
CAMPFIRE did just that, as well as a number of other things which directly
benefited not only the producer communities but the Zimbabwean economy and
political state at the same time. CAMPFIRE enjoys the full support of the
Zimbabwean government and as a result there have been almost no cases of
corruption associated with the program. As mentioned earlier, as much as 74%
of the revenues generated by CAMPFIRE have been reinvested into the producer
communities.
If there is any shortfall in Zimbabwe's counterpoaching strategy it lies in its
inability to more decisively affect the external support mechanism that sponsors
and encourages trans-border poaching. Zimbabwe, however, by recognizing that it
had limitations on its ability to project its influence across its borders, increased its
chances of success by strengthening a relationship within an environment it could
control. The result has been extremely positive. Poaching has all but been
eliminated for commercial purposes, local communities enjoy the benefits derived




into Zimbabwe far less frequent. What occurred in Zimbabwe was an
implementation of the right strategy for the right reasons.
D. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EXTERNAL/SUBSISTENCE)
The significance of this case study is the unique nature of an external/
subsistence poaching problem combined with a failure of the government to apply
any type of comprehensive program. What we see in the Central African Republic
(CAR) is a failure to realize the potential value of the abundant animal resources
within the country, as well as a failure to understand the full dimension of the
poaching problem, Predictably this has resulted in erratic and truncated initiatives.
As our model predicts, failure to address the problem in a comprehensive fashion,
taking into account both long and short cycle aspects, will, by definition, result in
failure.
1. Background
The details of the Central African Republic's struggle to preserve its
animal resources are not well documented, and little specific information is
available in English. We have however, included the CAR because of its hybrid
problem of an external/subsistence nature, and because in many ways, it is a
country that could gain the most by applying the counterpoaching model we
propose. The details of the situation in the CAR come from the personal
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experiences of one of the authors during four trips to the country (two in 1994 and
two in 1995) to conduct bio-diversity training with units from the army of CAR.
Unlike the other case study countries, the CAR is a former colony of
France. The differences in the French and British colonial systems has left a mark
on the conservation approaches of the CAR government. Like our other cases the
CAR's past conservation efforts were administered by the colonial power. To a
large extent the same is true today, because currently the Central Africans are not
controlling their own resources. In my experience in the CAR, none of the wildlife
park managers were Africans. This is not to say that hiring an experienced,
foreign conservationist is a poor decision in and of itself; rather it is more a
reflection of a lack of understanding and concern of Central Africans for their
animal resources. In my opinion, this is perfectly understandable when you
consider the governmental turmoil that the CAR has suffered since its
independence. It is not surprising that a country, which experienced its first free
and fair election in September of 1993, would be pre-occupied with problems
which might out-weigh their concerns for the environment. Paradoxically, it is
specifically the environment, and especially the animal resources, that could most
benefit this poor country. Regrettably, the CAR's efforts to counter the poaching
seems to be a matter of happenstance rather than deliberate planning.
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In the early 1990's the CAR received a portion of the 15 million dollars of
security assistance funding that was denied to Kenya due to their human rights
violations. With this came the opportunity to conduct exchange training with US
SOF personnel, through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program.
In 1994 the CAR, in an attempt to bolster an inadequate park ranger system,
resorted to using regular army forces to stem the poachers activities in two
separate regions. CAR counterpoaching efforts are divided between the northern
and eastern borders. In the north, Chadian poachers freely cross the sparsely
populated border using camels and horses to pack out sun dried meat and skins as
well as ivory. These items are then sold in local markets or are consumed by their
families. In the east, Sudanese rebels freely cross the border to poach animals for
meat to supply their war efforts.
To say that the CAR faces a serious poaching problem would be a gross
understatement. In 1994, one of the authors witnessed the severity of one group of
poachers efforts in the northern region while flying over their camp. The camp
was a processing station that we estimated had two tons of meat drying on racks in
the sun. The problems faced in the eastern region of the CAR were just as severe,
if not worse. In 1995, while conducting a training survey in eastern CAR, one of
the authors met professional hunter Rudy Lubin, whose safari camp had recently
been surrounded by a platoon-sized unit of Sudanese rebels who demanded, at gun
49
point, all his medical supplies, food and fuel. Mr. Lubin explained that during his
safaris he often encountered the remains of slaughtered animals and spent cases
from AK 47 's and other military weapons. It was his opinion that this was the
work of the Sudanese because the eastern portion of the CAR is so sparsely
populated the work could not be done by the indigenous population. Faced with
these serious problems, the CAR has had little success in slowing the poaching
problem.
2. CAR'S Solution
Unfortunately the CAR has no real plan or strategy in regards to counter-
poaching. This is a function of two very real constraints. First and foremost,
many of the government and military officials encountered did not clearly
understand, or see the value of, the unique animal resources they currently possess.
Nor do they have a comprehensive understanding of the poaching problem.
Secondly, the CAR army is currently too ill equipped and logistically impaired to
conduct successful long duration campaigns necessary to counter the poachers. As
a result, those forces that have received training through the JCET program are
typically unable to apply the skills they have acquired after the US forces have left.
The normal course of action is to focus all efforts on the obvious target, the
poacher himself, by reacting to reports from park managers after a poaching camp
has been spotted by plane. Once a camp has been spotted, park officials contact
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military forces garrisoned in the area. The military forces are then supposed to
react with an assault on the camp. This simple mission becomes very complicated
when the limitations of the CAR army are factored into the equation. Typically
the army has no maps of the area, so reaction to a specific location is very difficult.
Mobility problems due to lack of roads, reliable vehicles and fuel, and the lack of
communications equipment also hamper the reaction forces. In the end the
poacher, having seen the plane, begins to pack out his illegal gains and heads for
the safety of his border before the reaction forces have received notification from
the aircraft. In short, poaching continues almost unchecked in a country that
desperately needs the economic boost that these animals represent.
3. Analysis
When we compare the counterpoaching model to the course of action or
approach the CAR has taken, we clearly see that they have fallen prey to the
obvious, yet incorrect, approach of focusing all of their efforts on the manifesta-
tion of the problem. Faced with an external/subsistence problem of this magni-
tude, the CAR has failed to establish any relationship with those who could give
them the best and most accurate intelligence on the activities of the poachers, the
local population. While conducting training operations in both the eastern and
northern regions, one of the authors was told by military commanders that we
could not involve the local citizens because they were most likely poachers
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themselves, and if they weren't, they were at least complicit in helping the
poachers who pass through their villages. This is clearly an indication of failing to
understand the full dimension of the poaching problem. The rosetta stone of
solving the poaching problem has to start with the population and its link with the
government. Failing to establish or strengthen this link is likely to doom almost
any course of action to certain failure. To the credit of the CAR they have
attempted to open diplomatic talks with the Chadian government to solicit their
help in stemming cross border incursions. Whether or not the CAR would have
any success in this area if they approached the government in Khartoum is
doubtful due to the on-going civil strife. It is also questionable whether the
Chadian government really has any control over its citizens who are engaged in
poaching.
With the possibilities of limited diplomatic success, the CAR must change
its focus and attempt to solve the poaching problem without assistance from its
neighbors. To achieve any success the CAR must establish solid links with its
subjects who live near the game parks and on the borders of the state. Once these
links are established and the local citizens have been made stakeholders in the
preservation of the animals, the government can begin to exploit this relationship
to the detriment of the poacher. Accurate intelligence received from the locals can
then be used by CAR forces to react in a timely fashion, or to set up ambushes to
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interdict the poachers as they enter or exit the country. If the CAR fails to change
its focus, the poaching will continue along with the loss of valuable resources.
53
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of our research has provided a road-map for methodically
analyzing the poaching problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through the logical
comparison of poacher and insurgent we have constructed a framework in which
African states can begin to address the poaching problem more effectively. We
have developed a model that has predictive qualities and is effective in the
formulation of counterpoaching strategies as well as the assessment of current
strategies. In our effort to classify the poaching problem we have developed a
typology that discerns the differences between internal and external poaching and
the commercial or subsistence rationales for them. Through the classification of
poaching types and the application of the model to four varied cases, we have
offered analysis and comparisons that can assist African countries stem the losses
to their wildlife populations. However, the rationale for our analysis goes beyond
the limits of strictly providing insight into effective counterpoaching methods.
Our analysis, by illustrating the full dimensions of the poaching problem,
stresses the necessity of a multidimensional approach. Essentially a two-dimen-
sional problem, poaching consists of both long and short cycle problems. As a
result, any country faced with poaching must clearly distinguish the two, and
address them simultaneously. For a country to be successful, poaching must be
contained in the short run in order to buy time to resolve it in the long run. This is
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not to say that solutions are sequential and that when one problem is solved the
country can then begin to address the other. In fact, in the end, solving the
poaching problem requires moving in both directions in parallel.
The difficulty in understanding the dimensions of poaching is not unique to
African States. In reality, misinterpretation and mirror-imaging on the part of the
US and others has been just as serious. The obstacles to fully understanding the
problem must be overcome if any future meaningful US engagement is to take
place. In our opinion the US has a role to play in assisting both the long and short
cycle poaching problems in Africa. However, for any engagement to be of value,
the US will have to change the way it views Africa's animals and the poaching
problem.
To date, poaching has been confined to the consciousness of environ-
mentalists and conservationists in such organizations as the National Geographic
Society, the World Wildlife Foundation, and assorted animal rights groups.
Occasionally the topic of poaching may make it into national news papers and
25
popular magazines. However, in most cases, poaching and its side effects are
defined only by the loss of specific animal species. Poaching is rarely seen as a
manifestation of deeper social, economic, and political issues which, if left
25
See Bernstein, Richard "The Politics of Saving the Rhinoceros." The New York Times . 19 March 1997;
"Saving The Elephant," The Economist . 1 July 1989; and Chadwick, Douglas H., "Elephants, Out of
Time, Out of Space," National Geographic . May 1991.
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unchecked, result in damage far greater then the loss of a few selected species.
Because poaching has not been properly defined, it has failed to garner the
attention it deserves. By redefining poaching as something more than just loss of
wildlife, it becomes obvious that the opportunity cost of failing to address
poaching far outweighs the penalty of losing a valued natural resource.
A. OPPORTUNITY COST DEFINED
The opportunity costs in Africa of failing to protect wildlife resources can
be measured across a wide range of variables. Failing to pursue policies which
ensure the survival of scarce natural resources can cause states to lose
economically, socially, and politically. Economically, states will lose tourist
revenue. In each of the countries examined, wildlife is the primary reason for
tourist patronage. The number of tourists and the revenue generated by tourism
indicate that the presence of wildlife has a direct link to a state's ability to generate
revenue. It is therefore in the country's best interest to pursue policies which both
27
protect wildlife and recognize it as a long term and sustainable resource. Zambia
and Zimbabwe have adopted these types of policies, Kenya and the Central
African Republic have not. As Table 2 illustrates, the number of tourists as well as
26
Africa. South of the Sahara. 1996. Twenty-Fifth Edition. 1996, Europa Publications Limited, 1995.
For an in depth analysis and set of recommendations regarding economic, social and political aspects of
tourism in developing countries see Emanuel de Kadt's, Tourism. Passport to Development?. A joint
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the revenue generated by tourism has increased in the years since these policies
were adopted. Accurate figures regarding number of tourists and amount of tourist
generated revenue proved difficult to find in any one source for all four countries.
Conflicting figures lead us to believe that any precise evaluation or prediction
based on these figures alone would be unwise. However, when general trends in
tourism are compared to the existence of robust animal populations in countries
whose major draw for tourism is their wildlife, it seems more then coincidental
that the tourist industry in Zambia, and particularly Zimbabwe, is growing while it
seems to be decreasing in Kenya. Kenya, in adhering to a one-dimensional
policy of protection has experienced little or no gain in tourism or in tourist
generated revenue. Policies regarding wildlife resources, those of protection and
those of utilization have more then merely economic impact, they have a
significant spill-over effect into social and political issues as well.
From a political and social standpoint, policies of protection, which either
restrict or deny benefits derived from the existence of healthy animal populations,
serve only to worsen the relationship between local populations and the animals as
well as the relationship between the government and local populations. Overly
protective policies will handicap local communities who are unwillingly forced to
28
Dr. Brian Child, Statement by Dr. Brian Child, Submitted to the House Committee in International
Relations, Subcommittee on Africa on Economic Development of Africa's Resources, March 17, 1997.
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coexist with the wildlife. Additionally, protective policies may force the govern-
ment to play the heavy-handed role of policy enforcer and wildlife protector. This
puts the government at odds with local populations who frequently live on the
periphery where government control and influence is inherently weak. The
government's inability to enforce its policy only demonstrates its inefficiency and
does little to cultivate feelings of trust and confidence within rural communities.
Conversely, policies of utilization, that transfer ownership of animal
resources to local populations as in the CAMPFIRE and ADMADE programs,
serve to benefit the government as well as local populations while protecting the
state's natural resources. Empowering local communities at the grass roots level
and making them the beneficiaries of revenue generated from wildlife-related
industry makes them stakeholders in the system. As stakeholders they tend to act
responsibly and do everything within their power to optimize the benefits they
derive from the existence of animal resources. Table 3 depicts the revenues
generated and the distribution of funds from the CAMPFIRE program. This
program is an example ofhow a successful utilization program can generate large
sums of revenue and how that revenue can immediately benefit the producer
communities. Programs such as these positively effect the relationship between
the state government and the peripheral populations.
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Distribution of CAMPFIRE Revenue in Zimbabwe
1990 1991 1992 1993
Total wildlife income (Z$) 1,098,855 1,975,243 5,511,450 6,597,353
Money retained centrally for 68.2% 36.0% 31.9% 13.8%
general district administration
Money used for central wildlife 3.0% 13.9% 9.6% 18.3%
management
Money devolved to 'producer 47.0% 62% 58% 74%
communities'
Table 3. CAMPFIRE Revenue
B. PROTECTION AND UTILIZATION
As we look at the most recent record of elephant poaching in Africa, we see
that there appears to be a causal link between programs of protection and the re-
emergence of poaching. In September of 1997, Kenya experienced the loss of five
elephants to poachers. Kenya claims that this is due to the June 1997 CITES
29
conference that confirmed that certain countries could sell surplus ivory stocks.
What is telling in this incident is that none of the countries now employing
utilization programs have reported any losses to their elephant populations as a
result of the recent CITES conference. The reason seems clear to us. Kenya has
chosen to blame the threat of lifting the ivory ban for their recent loss. In reality,
29
The Associated Press, "Fears of Ivory Poaching Climb After 5 elephants Killed," 2 October 1997.
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Kenya's failure to develop a grass-roots program that creates stakeholders has
allowed the re-emergence of poachers who see the opportunity for quick monetary
returns. In Zimbabwe, Zambia, and other states engaged in programs of
utilization, the poacher has not re-emerged because he is now the stakeholder.
That is to say, he is no longer a poacher but a guardian of the animal for his own
benefit.
C. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
After closer examination it is readily apparent why effectively protecting
wildlife resources is in Africa's best interest. What may not be as obvious is why
it is in the US's best interest to play a pro-active role in this process or how
involvement in poaching can be a vehicle for pursuing other long term aims that
further both US and African interests. At a state policy level, aiding Africa with
domestic and economic development programs supports the US policy of Engage-
ment and Enlargement. As outlined in the Congressional Presentation Docu-
ments (CPD), US policy goals regarding much of Africa are centered around
democratization and economic development, professionalization of military forces,
and improved civil military relations. In our opinion, direct and sustained
contact with US organizations, military or otherwise, provide the cornerstone for
30
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International Development.
62
achieving these policy aims. First, direct contact allows for an accurate assessment
of the host nation's needs. Second, it helps assure that US funds are utilized to
their maximum potential and are directed towards their intended purpose. Finally,
it contributes to a wider range of civil and military issues that US policy makers
regard as paramount for developing democracies. These include subordination of
military forces to civil government, and the furthering of democratic processes.
From the CPD's and from USAID projections, it is clear that the US will
continue to spend money in an effort to assist African development. As long as the
US has chosen to expend large sums of revenue on development in Africa, it
should do so wisely, and in conjunction with programs that can have immediate
and long term benefits for both African and US interests. We argue that counter-
poaching is just the type of program that has the potential to deliver these benefits.
However, for any response to be successful it must be couched in the terms of
social, economic, political, and military constraints of the host nation and consider
both short and long cycle aspects.
US policy makers must realize that the type of aid provided will play a
deciding role in the strategy adopted for combating specific problems. Because of
this relationship, the US has a responsibility to accurately analyze and suggest
possible courses of action in conjunction with specific types of aid. All too often
US aid packages focus on sophisticated or technologically advanced solutions
63
which are incompatible with the campaign plan that a state is capable of
executing. Policy makers fall prey to mirror imaging and prescribe solutions that
only more advanced states could hope to execute. Technologically advanced and
complex strategies require proficiency in fundamental skills and capabilities
which many developing states have not yet developed.
Without a firm foundation in basic skills, advanced systems are sub-
optimized and in some cases rendered useless. The use of surveillance aircraft or
advanced radar systems, for example, does little good if the costs are so prohibitive
that the country can not afford to maintain or operate the equipment. From an
operational standpoint, high-tech equipment is of little value if the absence of
fundamental skills, such as land navigation, or standardized communications
procedures negates the states' ability to deliver reaction forces to specific areas.
Because most of the countries faced with poaching are faced with these kinds of
limitations our focus must be on low-tech and easily sustainable programs. By
focusing our programs on instilling fundamentals we increase the chances for
success and sustainment while simultaneously laying the foundation for
introducing future technological advancements which can then be optimized.
Formulating an aid package that balances assets and capabilities while optimizing
the likelihood for successful and sustainable operations will be pivotal to
combating the problem. Due to the nature of the poaching problem and because of
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the limited assets of most counties confronting it, the greatest likelihood for
success will lie in low-tech, long-term, and sustainable programs.
D. SHORT CYCLE SOLUTIONS
Addressing the short cycle component of the problem lies with the state's
military or wildlife ranger force. The role ofUS military forces in combating the
short cycle problem will be that of trainer and advisor. This is a role for which US
Special Operations Forces are ideally suited. SOF's regional orientation, unique
language capability, and minimal "signature" provide a more flexible response to
the needs of the host nation without over-burdening them with large deployments.
In contrast to conventional forces who rely on large command structures, cumber-
some logistic requirements, and regimented problem solving procedures, SOF are
accustomed to thinking about complex problems which require unconventional
approaches in environments that necessitate working within the limitations of the
host country. Another distinct advantage of SOF is its low cost. Because of their
smaller organic size SOF units are considerably more cost effective, typically
providing results that are disproportionate to their size.
31
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E. A WIN-WIN SITUATION
One of the distinct advantages of this type of engagement is that both
countries stand to gain from a variety of perspectives. On a large scale, the
African country benefits by developing a capability to effectively protect its
natural resources. Developing, protecting, and sustaining this resource will allow
certain African countries to wean themselves away from single product economics
as well as maximizing the return from already productive tourist industries. More
robust and diversified economies can contribute to more stable environments in
which occasional ebbs and flows in the world marketplace will not as readily
translate into recession or depression.
From a military aspect, African militaries gain the benefit of receiving US
doctrinal training which increases their professionalization, proficiency and
expertise. These skills not only prepare African forces for counterpoaching duties,
but in many instances are translated into the same skills required for participation
in the African Intervention Force Initiative and UN peacekeeping operations.
African militaries also benefit from the example set by US forces who demonstrate
the ideal of military subordination to civil authority.
32
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On a grand scale, the US benefits from this type of engagement as well.
Most sub-Saharan African countries continue to grapple with the challenges of the
post-Cold War era. Many countries are in the process of developing stable govern-
mental structures, professional military forces, and modern economies. It is in the
US's interest to become involved at this stage for two distinct reasons. First, it is
more cost effective to become engaged now, during the developmental process,
than to wait until a system emerges that is either unacceptable or so unsuccessful
that it gives rise to crises. Second, it is easier to shape specific aspects of an
emerging state's environment during the developmental process. Consistent with
the medical adage of "an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure," early
US involvement, that addresses specific and localized problems before they
become systemic, is nothing more than preventive diplomacy.
Militarily, the US benefits as well. Special Operations Forces engaged in
the kind of exchanges we advocate are serving the exact purpose for which they
were created. Although these missions are generically referred to as "training,"
they are in fact the employment of SOF in a key mission for which they were
designed. This type of "live" environment operation can not be replicated at
training centers, nor can evaluations from training centers honestly assess a units
ability to carry out this type of operation. Engaged in these operations, SOF can
further hone the skills required to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special
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Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), and Unconventional Warfare (UW) . 33
Maintenance of these skills better prepares SOF for future missions, regardless of
geographic location. Another positive attribute of these operations is the close
personal contact and rapport that is established between members of both
militaries.
F. THE MERITS OF ABSTRACTION
Whether the US will choose to engage Africa today in ways that we have
suggested remains to be seen. This thesis illustrates how an indirect or unorthodox
approach can be applied to a wide range of complex issues. The uniqueness of our
approach is that it is not centered around any preconceived notion ofhow
problems should be solved based on past experience. We don't presume that pro-
active US engagement in counterpoaching will be the sole determining factor in
aiding the development of African countries. We do argue that this approach
illustrates the possibilities of addressing problems through unorthodox means and
that a "one size fits all" approach that may have been successful elsewhere may
have little or no chance of success on the African continent. The unique aspects
and attributes of Africa force the outsider to look for creative avenues when
considering engagement strategies.
"Howard, Russell D., "Army Special Operations Forces and the Pacific Century," Roles and Missions of
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68
G. A WORD OF CAUTION
Simply identifying a potentially successful indirect or unorthodox approach
is not a guarantee of success. The type of approach we advocate, by its nature,
requires time to mature and show results. Additionally, the measures of effective-
ness by which the approach is gauged may be defined differently by those who
sponsor the program and those who implement it. This is especially true when the
political, social, and economic differences between the sponsor and the recipient
are profound. Failing to recognize these differences can result in the failure of an
otherwise successful plan. Evidence of this can be seen in recent developments
regarding Africa's conservation efforts.
At the most basic level the problem is one of perspective. To non-Africans
and to Africans, the survival of diverse wildlife populations mean drastically
different things. To many African states, wildlife is viewed as a natural resource
to be utilized as a source of revenue. To westerners, Africa's wildlife is seen as a
perishable treasure to be protected at any cost. Programs like CAMPFIRE and
ADMADE have advanced to the point where the African concept of utilizing
wildlife has come into conflict with the outside world's preoccupation with
preserving it. Many African states have now fully realized the benefits of
maintaining a sustainable animal population. They have also been able to
determine the optimal size of that resource. Because of these program's success,
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animal populations have exceeded their optimal size. To the African there is no
reason not to take advantage of this surplus.
Failing to consider any perspective other then their own, westerners have
attempted to stymie the African's effort to realize the full potential of surplus
populations. Through the ivory ban and attempts at anti-hunting legislation,
outsiders have tried to impose their will and dictate how Africans should use their
own resources. Africans see this as a continuation of a century long problem of
external influence determining the plight of their continent.
Should the US choose to engage African states, it must avoid mirror
imaging and the propensity for dictating what Africa can and can not do once
specific programs begin to yield results. Sponsors of indirect or unorthodox
approaches need to realize that the evolution of some programs may not follow
anticipated or predictable paths. Additionally, the maturing process of these
programs may further yield byproducts which are not readily palatable to the
sponsor. Regarding Africa's wildlife, the US and world communities must be
willing to allow Africa to deter-mine what will be done with any excess
population. Any plan or program that changes the perception of a population
regarding a specific asset or resource may be initiated externally, but ownership of
Chris Chinaka, "Zimbabwe Hits Out Against Environment Campaigners," Reuters News Service, 1
1
June 1997, and "Congress Rejects Anti-Hunting Plan," American Rifleman . November/December, 1997.
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that plan, along with any benefits derived from its implementation must ultimately
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